1: Garnett B-4, 5 (ca. 1880) 1891
MA11 Kurd MA11

630
631 elders having great weight, and, as I shall subse-
632 quently point out, even the women are not excluded
from a share in the politics of the tribe.

● 175 Though more or less dominated by the numerous
184 conquerors who have successively, for three thousand
years, overrun those regions which are now called
Kurdistan, the Kurds have never ceased to own a
distinct nationality. Since the Ottoman conquest
they have been constantly wavering between the two
rival powers of Islam—the Sunnis and the Shias, as
represented by the Turks and the Persians respectively,
siding, according to the exigencies of the time, now
with one party and now with the other. Notwith-
720 standing their sufferings in the destructive wars of
649 conquest waged for centuries by Turk and Persian,
184 and the constant internal feuds fomented by both
those nations in order to weaken the power of the
Kurdish warriors, they still maintain a sort of semi-
independence, preserving their nationality as distinct
from that of their neighbours as in earlier days,
though possessing no dynasty, political constitution,
ancient religion, historical traditions, or literature, to
bind them together.

667 Three times during the present century have
national aspirations incited them to throw off the
Turkish yoke; but owing to the immense extent of
mountainous country over which they are scattered,
their successes have been but partial and ephemeral.
181 Representatives as they probably are of the ancient
179 Chaldeans, no other race has, perhaps, so long pre-
served its nationality under conditions so unfavourable.

ountains and Khalifa Sirvanshan. In addition to being 101
inhabited by those noted for their toughness, this country
as been the meeting place of empires and cultural tradi-
ions, in the latest centuries those of the Arabs, Persians,
nd Turks. The Kurds, because of their numerical strength,
mphasis on arms, and religion, fared far better in the
hanges of the First World War than some of their Christian
eighbors.

By "Kurd" one has reference to an ethic unit or nation
hose most distinctive characteristics are its language and
ustoms. Coupled with these are a large number of minor
eculiarities which differentiate it from other Islamic
eoples. Kurdish culture as a whole, however, is an amalgam 105
in which the more recent influences of the Arab, Persian,
nd Turk are easily discernible and many things, such as
rthodox religious practices, may be assigned definite
istorical origins. Despite the abundance of foreign
lements, Kurdish life has its own distinctive form. 114
istory of the Kurds has not been satisfactorily explored,
nd those few treatments which have appeared are, for the
ost part, disappointing, for they have been written by
ersons whose aims were far from academic or whose scholar-
hip is doubtful. Without entering the controversies which 175
urround the antiquity of the nation, the Kurds seem to
ppear first in classical literature as the Kardouki of
enophon and the Gordyaei of Strabo, a mountain people
truggling much the same area as they do today.[1] Their 174
177

[1]Driver, 1922, pp. 481-483.

and highland meadows. Water is abundant and swift perennial streams from icy springs cut the landscape. Many of the mountains are capped with snow throughout the year, and the plains around Sulaymaniya constitute one of the most verdant areas in Iraq. The region has suffered extensive deforestation, but poplar and willow abound along the watercourses and a few stands of heavier timber, such as oak, may yet be found in the uplands. The rivers and streams offer fish, and bear, ibex, snow leopards, and wolves are still to be encountered on the mountainsides. Here at the highest elevations, the area is blasted by the sun in summer, scorching the vegetation, but to a lesser extent than in the plains to the south. With the winter season of rain and snow, many of the passes are blocked for several months. The temperatures in either summer or winter, however, are not extreme. In spring the meadows are filled with brightly-colored flowers, particularly the poppy, but their life is short before the onset of the summer heat.

The Kurdish town of Rowandus is to be found in the mountains fifty miles northeast of Erbil. In older days Rowandus was directly on the trade route between Erbil and Iran, but the recent construction of an automobile highway by the British has removed it from the main stream of what remains of this traffic.[1] The exact antiquity of the town is uncertain, but it first achieved prominence as the headquarters of Mar Isaha, a chieftain who gained temporary

[1]Recounted in Hamilton, 1937.

independence from the Turks in the early decades of the nineteenth century. A ruined fortress of this leader is to be seen a short distance north of the town, and his descendants, the House of Isma'il Beg, still own much of its property. The Turks, who appreciated the strategic significance of Rowandus with relation to the trade route and the possibility of a military advance along this line from Russia, made it the seat of a _kaimmaqam_, an Ottoman governor, subject to the Kirkuk _sanjaq_ (district) of the _vilayet_ (province) of Mosul. Administratively it was equal in rank to Erbil, and immediately prior to the First World War had one or two battalions of infantry stationed nearby, as well as a police detachment. As a part of the monarchy of Iraq, it is now much more of an administrative than a commercial center and is still under a _kaimmaqam_, but denoted beneath the control of Erbil.

In Ottoman times Rowandus was a flourishing town of about a thousand houses and had a population estimated at 5000. It occupied a sloping tongue of land, running east and west along the Rowandus river. The river was joined just above the town, to the west, by another stream flowing through a gorge then called the Kalund, and above this juncture rose a great bluff, several hundred feet above the floor of the valley, termed Qala Tilek (Arabic, _qala'a_, "fortress"). The flat top of this bluff was occupied by the house of Isa'id Beg, a descendant of Ker Pasha, the villas of the Turkish officers, some summer residences of

CHAPTER II

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER

To give a description of Rowandus, its administrative and economic importance, as well as its social and religious life, demands a certain excursus above and beyond the actual physical limits of the town. To understand the role of the town, not only as a rural center, but in broader cultural horizons, one must have some understanding of the areas within which it lies. It is not intended to enter into an exhaustive discussion of either regional cultures or of a civilization, for that presupposes a much more extended survey than either the basis or the framework of this study can support, but rather to indicate the proper perspective in which the town must be viewed. The most convenient beginning to this task is not to be found in an economic or social background, but in the government, for in proceeding from its delineation, in many cases generalized with respect to district and to nation, an effective appreciation of later discussion can be formed. (2) 36

Thus a clearer definition of the position of Rowandus as an administrative center requires in some wise an appreciation of the constitution of Iraq itself, on whose northeastern border lies the district dominated by the town. A segment of the old Ottoman Empire, the territory of modern Iraq was 175 648

freed from the Turks during the First World War and thereafter recognized as an independent state, temporarily assigned as a mandate to Great Britain. The early organization of the country took place under British guidance, and was defined by an "Organic Law" of 1925 as a limited monarchy with a responsible government. The legislative bodies consist of a Chamber of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwwab) of elected representatives and a Senate (Majlis al-A'yan) of nominated elder statesmen. One of the salient features of this government is that, aside from the deputies, no other public official is elected by popular suffrage, from the Prime Minister to the village postmaster. It is very much as if the citizens of the United States voted only on members to the House of Representatives, and all other officers connected with public life were appointed by a central government in Washington, D. C. In Iraq there are, to be sure, local "advisory councils" to the governors, but their membership is in practice selective. On the conduct of elections themselves there is much variation of opinion, and, without failing to one side or the other, it is possible to say quite fairly that neither the electorate or the Chamber itself have fully realized the possibilities of the democratic power within their hands. There is thus, not only among the Kurdish minority, but in many quarters in Iraq, a strong popular sentiment, correct or incorrect, that even their elected officials improperly or impotently represent the people.

grievances of the former and explaining and facilitating 622
the operations of the latter. He is called upon to certify certain government documents, such as an order for a young man's conscription, together with two chosen old men who act as witnesses. Ra'uf Effendi claimed to be assisted by two informal "agents" who brought him secretly the news circulating in the town, probably his own device for keeping in regular touch with popular opinion. Socially the office of mukhtar presupposes a qualification of wealth, for he is expected to maintain a divankhane (a room in his house in which guests of social distinction could be appropriately received and entertained). Although Rowandoz itself is non-tribal and the people as a whole pay no allegiance to a chieftain, it will be seen in comparison with later exposition that the mukhtar, with several other wealthy men, occupies a position in society analogous to that of an aristocrat. In fact, a girl, castigated by her relatives in a love affair, may seek sanctuary in the house of the mukhtar, a custom which is solely reserved for chieftains in the countryside. Such a case occurred in 1949 and Ra'uf Effendi was able to smooth over the affair, arranging the girl's marriage with the youth in question.

In closing this section it remains to contrast the present administration of the district with that of the Ottoman Empire immediately prior to the first World War. In that time Rowandoz was the seat (a kaza) of a kaimmakam under the Kirkuk sanjak of the vilayet of Mosul. Administratively it was thought as important as Erbil and, as

2: Masters E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

today, a number of troops were garrisoned there. With respect to Erbil, the administrative equality has been changed, although a fifth nahiya added to the Ottoman four. It cannot be said that the Ottoman administration with its officers, judges, tax-collectors, and its serai was too different in outward form from that of today. The knowledge of bureaucratic government is nothing new to the district. In contrast to the present administration, however, the Turks were extremely venal, but it cannot be legitimately said, as it is with respect to other former Ottoman holdings, that they were vicious. While there were often skirmishes between segments of the population and the Ottoman gendarmes and troops, there is no particular recollection of Turkish "atrocities" in the area, for in the nineteenth century the Kurds, at home in their mountains, were the military equals of their opponents. The opening of new roads and the adoption of modern arms has changed much of this, and the Kurd has learned to respect automatic weapons, artillery, and aircraft. In a number of regards, such as education and public health, it can be seen that the new government enters much more completely into the interests of the people, and, according to popular opinion, has subverted many functions formerly reserved to the chieftains alone. In summary, it appears that the administration today is at once more rigorous and more enlightened than that of Ottoman times.

In conclusion certain observations on the present administration may be reinforced. It can be observed how

or religious. In Ottoman times, while it was an administrative center under Turkish rule, Rowanduz had considerable importance because it lay astride the trade route between Iran and Erbil, and from Erbil the Jezire plain and Syria, and a great volume of caravan trade passed through its gates. Today the automobile road constructed by British engineers bypasses the town and commerce following the old direction need have no reference to the town itself. With an obvious political background, the British mandate in Iraq and the withdrawal of Bolshevik Russia from Middle Eastern affairs, much of this pass trade has dwindled. Prior to the first World War, a great part of the manufactured goods, like those of the general merchant listed above and merchandised in Iranian Azerbaijan and northern Iraq, came from Russia, porcelain, glassware, metalware, cloth, samovars, kerosene, and the like, some of the more precious items still preserved in Rowanduz households as family heirlooms. With the British domination of the markets of Iraq, the focus of trade for this area has shifted almost completely from the north to the south. Even what was an item manufactured in the Soviet Union is the bazar of Rowanduz. It may be supposed that the Turks selected Rowanduz as a seat of government because of this importance in trade, and the administrative demotion of the town under Erbil, where formerly the two were equals, can be taken as a reflection of commercial decline.

It has been seen that the only important produce of

[i.e. the town of Rowanduz.—Ed.]

2: Masters E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowandus
Yezidis MH10

K
771
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but must never be struck. For an "unbeliever" to use the curse in the name of religion, of which the full form is Le'anetu Yllahi 'ala dinek, "the damnation of God on your faith," is an invitation to certain catastrophe.

Y
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There are certain groups in Iraq, neither Muslim, Christian, or Jewish, the Yezidis or "devil-worshippers" of Jebel Sinjar and the Mandeans of the southern provinces, who, as peaceful farmers and craftsmen, do not often come to the notice of the bulk of the population, and are regarded in the popular mind as curiosities more than anything else. The Yezidi girls are supposed to be "the most beautiful in the world," the same thing said by both Muslim and Christians in Lebanon and Syria of the Druse women. There is no intermarriage between the Muslims and these groups.

Y
[142]

Y
[582]

The second division is to be found among Muslims themselves, between those of the Sunna ("Custom") or orthodoxy, whose recognition of the legitimacy of the first four successors of the Prophet is perhaps the best known characteristic, and those of the Shi'ah ("party," from Shi'at 'Ali, "the party of 'Ali"), originally revolutionary, who insist on the primacy of the son-in-law of the Prophet and his descendants. The latter tradition has been the state religion of Iran from the time of the Safavid Shahs (1501-1736), and today includes, in one form, the peoples of Iran, Pakistan, and the agricultural population of southern Iraq. In central and northern

K
795
779
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Iraq the Sunnis is represented by most of the Arab groups, 795
the Kurds, the Turks, and the Turkomans. The conflict be- 779
tween the two, often with violent political expressions, is 175
most the same as that between Catholi and Protestant in [578]
Germany, although there is little enmity in the type of
religious contest. The governing elas in Iraq, deriving
from Ottoman times, is about half Sunnis, and the dis-
cussion is often phrased along ethnic lines, Arab and Turk 795
against Arab and Persian. Certain fastions, such as 186
staining the beard with henna, are condemned by the Kurds [302]
alternatively as Shiite or Iranian. Curiously, they
imagine circumcision, in the Middle East purely Arabic and [304]
Ingrid, as Farsi, "Persian," despi: the fact that the
practice seems to have no record in that country. One
might suppose, particularly in view of the growth of pan-
Islamic movements in recent years, that this distinction
between Sunnite and Shiite was falling into decay. At a
gathering in Rowanduz the investigator, on being informed
by an army officer that he came fro the southern provinces,
innocently inquired if he belonged to the Shi'ah. When the
officer replied seriously in the affirmative, there was a
burst of laughter and derision from Kurdish officers and
officials, a matter of no little embarrassment. Here on [582]
the highest levels of society, there are few marriages be-
tween Sunnite and Shiite families.

The third division is on ethnic or national lines, 563
which, aside from foreigners and non-Muslims, separates

upper class in the second system, is unnecessary for this group. Ra'uf Effendi, for example, cannot read or write, although he can sign his name and speaks four languages fluently. It is with these "genteel" commoners that there is intermarriage among the aristocracy, although commoners can never attain the rank of a chieftain. The basis of the class are either wealth or literacy. A mullā can be extremely poor and still enjoy the distinction. It might be mentioned that the lowest class of civil servants, the clerks, as well as Christians and Jews, if wealthy, are addressed by the same term elsewhere in Iraq. A teacher, however, does not always like to be called effendi because he has had a college or university education, and, no matter how poorly paid, belongs to the educated upper class of the second system.

Rowanduz is non-tribal and does not, as a whole, owe allegiance to any particular chieftain, although the Bravo of Isma'il Beg owns a great part of the town. "We do not belong to tribes," Ra'uf Effendi explained, "although perhaps our ancestors did, but we have no knowledge of them." Persons of the lower classes, townsfolk or migrants from the villages, may, of course, retain tribal affiliations. In Ottoman times, Rowanduz enjoyed an independence, just as it does today, from tribal or feudal obligations. The wealthy merchants of the town, particularly those engaged in the lucrative caravan trade with Iran, were called zhelebis, another Turkish term for "gentleman,"

gay fellow into disuse. In imitation of the aristocracy, 565
many of the most powerful maintained followings of armed 175
men and dissolutions open to the public, and one might com-
pare them to the "merchant princes" of other lands, for
example, the burghers of Medieval Germany. They were, in
fact, a pseudo-aristocracy. After the sack of the town
during the first World War, and the decline of trade, this
class suffered greatly in numbers and in wealth, although
it is still represented by such persons as Ra'uf Effendi
in the group of commoners designated effendis. One example 565
of the manner in which the shaikhly and their modern 637
successors have assumed the functions of the chieftainship
is illustrated by sanctuary. In 1949 a girl of the town,
detected in illicit relations with a young man, took
refuge in Ra'uf Effendi's house. He protected her and
arranged her marriage with the youth in question, with, one
might add, the help of the police. One of the chief char- 565
acteristics of this highest commoner group is its mobility, (52)
for any person who has obtained great wealth can add himself
to it, just as those whose fortunes have declined can lose
its distinction.

The second concept operating to form a hierarchy in 412
the commoner group is the distinction between skilled and 565
unskilled labor. The lesser merchants and craftsmen, as
one might expect, are of a higher status than common laborers.
This group of more favored persons includes the carpenters,
cloth-sellers, cobblers, masons, poorer shopkeepers, tailors,

CHAPTER I

FIELD OF INVESTIGATION

The Kurds are an Indo-European people whose tongue, which has several dialects, is related to Persian. By religion they are Sunnis of the Shafi'i rite of Islam. Kurdistan has never existed as a political concept, though the Kurds appear through history to have inhabited the same mountainous areas as they do today. To the north their country, whose backbone is the Anti-Taurus, is bounded by a line drawn through Erivan, Erzerum, Erzinjan and then in a crescent through Marash towards Aleppo. To the south-west the line runs along the foot of the mountains to Mosul, thereafter to the Tigris and Mosul and then in a straight line to Mandali on the frontier between Iraq and Iran. To the east the limit of the Kurdish area runs in a south-easterly direction from Erivan, comprises the Malte district, part of Khoi, Urmia, Mahabad, Saqqiz and Sanna to Kirmanshah. The main road from Kirmanshah to Kermal, and thereafter in a straight line to Mandali, roughly forms the border between the actual Kurds and the Lakhs and Luri related to them.

Descriptions of people who can be taken as the ancestors of the Kurds of our day are found in Xenophon's Anabasis (400 B.C.) and given by Strabo (64 B.C.–20 A.D.). It has been maintained that the Kurds were identical with the Medes of ancient times. In regard to the various theories concerning the origin of the Kurds see Nikitine[1]. The legend concerning a mysterious descent can be found in "Sharafnameh", the history of the Kurds, written in Persian in 1596. Since the Median Kingdom succumbed to the Persian king, Cyrus, in 550 B.C., the area that is now Southern Kurdistan was first a part of the Achaemenid kingdom (until 331 B.C.) and was thereafter ruled by the Greek Seleucids, by the Parthians, Persian Sassanids, Arabian caliphs, Mongols and Turkomans, until the Persian Safavi dynasty and the Ottoman empire had (1639) the boundary between them through Kurdistan. Today this area, which is inhabited by about 7 million Kurds, is divided between Iran, Turkey and Iraq, with small overlappings in Syria and the Soviet Union[2]. There, in 1639, the Persian Kurds were separated from their countrymen, who remained under Turkish rule until the end of the First World War.

At the end of that conflict in 1918 the new Turkish areas, the Basra and Baghdad Vilayets, were united to the Arab State, Iraq, under British mandate, whilst the question of the national status of the third area, the Mosul Vilayet, whose northern components were inhabited by Kurds, was made the subject of various negotiations, eventually [illegible] decided at the peace negotiations at Sèvres in 1920 of creating an autonomous Kurdish state with a prospect of complete independence[3]. This was to comprise the area east of the Euphrates inhabited

by Kurds, including the northern, mountainous part of the Mosul Vilayet. The idea was crystallized in Article 62 (delimitation of the area) and Article 64 of the Peace Treaty[1], which, however, was never ratified. At the final conclusion of peace at Lausanne in 1923, a shortened, mutilated Turkey no longer existed, but instead a strong young republic under Kemal Atatürk, and all idea of an autonomous Kurdish state was abandoned. The whole of the Mosul Vilayet with its rich oil fields around Kirkuk was placed under Iraq, which in 1922 was made a kingdom under Faisal I, the son of the Sherif of Mecca, but still under British mandate until 1932. The frontier between Iraq and Turkey was fixed along the Brussels or Bowring line[2] by negotiations between Turkey, Iraq and Great Britain at Ankara in 1926. The justifiably disappointed Kurds, who had won their dream of an independent Kurdistan here at Sèvres and killed at Lausanne, had since their failings by repeated national revolts in Turkey[3], Iran[4] and in Iraq. Whereas the Mosul Vilayet was "disputed territory"[5], the British mandate government appointed Sheikh Mahmud (b. 1881, d. 1956)[6] Governor in Sulaimani, the provincial capital in the Sulaimani Liwa, with guaranteed autonomy. When he became too troublesome for the mandate government, proclaiming himself ruler, king, of Kurdistan, he was replaced in 1919 by Major E. B. Soane[7], who as early as 1909 had accepted bribes and by his great knowledge of Kurdistan over many years was closely in touch with the Kurds. The first Kurdish paper[8] was started on Sept. 20th 1920, and at the same time Kurdish became for the first time the official language of the Administration. However, Soane was recalled to England in 1922 as his wish for an independent Kurdistan no longer conformed to the attitude created towards the end of the pro-Allied negotiations at Lausanne. Sheikh Mahmud was once more appointed, which resulted in revolts under his leadership in 1922-24, 1927 and in 1930-31, and under Ahmed al-Barzani in 1932. For the political development in these years see Longrigg and Stoakes[9], and Edmonds[10].

My personal impression of political conditions amongst the Kurds I found with in 1957 can be summarized as follows: The Iraqi Kurds in a town like Sulaimani, the intellectual capital of Southern Kurdistan, look to the north, to Soviet Russia[11]. It was stated that the small group of Kurds living under the Soviet Union had better facilities to retain their lingual and cultural independence than the Kurds (about one million) in Arab Iraq. In Tashkent, for example, a Kurdish university was said to have been opened. Despite the fact that Beirut University in Lebanon had hitherto always been the place at which well-to-do young Kurds studied, and the Orphan Committee[12] still existed, the Kurds, while I was in Iraqi Kurdistan, looked to the north, to Communism, and hoped that their dream of an independent Kurdistan would some day be realized from that quarter.

When two previously have written about Kurdish women scenes from the pens of men, Harding gives the following description of the Arab women in Baghdad: "... visions in dark blue with black masks, which also shroud in folds yellow boots, and which men are told are women," adding: "... in fact an better disguise than these hideous shrouds ... could have been invented by Oriental jealousy to warn away prying eyes and damp the spirit of libertinism ...."[13] Frazer, 1948, says concerning the Kurdish women that "... they do not wear veils like the Persian women, the utmost practised in this way being to bring the end of the handkerchief, with which their heads are covered, across their mouths

4: Hansen E-5 (1997) 1961 MA11 Kurd MA11

keep their wives in seclusion, and this practice has quite recently sprung up being due to Turkish influence ...."[6]. Aziz Edmonds writes: "Many travellers before 1914 recorded their impression that Kurdish women enjoyed in general a good deal more freedom than their Arab, Turkish and Persian sisters"[7]. In regard to marriage and the polygyni mentioned by the Coran and known in other Muslim areas, Eagle[8] declares that: "The Kurd from north to south is monogamous" adding:[9] "free intercourse between the sexes is the rule, and the result is a large number of love marriages ....".

It is fact that the individual Kurdish women of the upper class has, in situations difficult for the Kurdish people, sprung into the limelight, which seems incompatible with the view adopted concerning women's restricted possibilities of action in Muslim areas, but may possibly be due to the prominent position of their families[10]. Khanzen Osman Pasha, Lady Adila of Halabja[11] of the Ardalan Wazir family, married to Osman Pasha of the Bogzada family, is the best known case. Her husband, towards the end of the Turkish period, was made the qa'im maqām in Halabja. Even whilst he was alive all effective authority passed to his wife. In 1910 Major Soane lived as a servant with her son, Tahir Beg, after Soane had escaped Islam in 1906 and, under the name of Mirza Ghulam Hussain Shirazi, travelled in these areas in disguise. Later, under the British mandate after 1918, it was she, now a widow, with whom the British political officers negotiated. Her personality must have been

Fig. 2. Village ornamentary. Married woman at the garden basin. Barkan.
Fig. 3. Village ornamentary. Married woman making cigarettes. Barkan. (See p. 14).

Fig. 4. Peasant women baking bread on circular iron sheet. Sulaim. (See p. 10).

a very strong one as she was definitely in opposition to Sheikh Mahmud of Sulaimani, head of the holy family of Barzinji sheikhs[2], and the representative of the dream of a free and independent Kurdistan. Lady Adila died in 1934 during the British mandate period. Her grave, which I visited at a burial ground near the village of Alwhalo, some distance from Halabja, was in 1957 deserted and neglected. My interpreter told me that it was in accordance with Lady Adila's own wish that her grave was neither marked nor maintained, but added that people drove sheep and goats over the grave, and that, altogether, there was but little sympathy for the memory of Lady Adila of Halabja, an attitude that appeared to be shared by my interpreter, who, on another occasion, referred with the deepest veneration to Lady Adila's political opponent Sheikh Mahmud, as the real ruler and noble (king) of Kurdistan.

Whereas Lady Adila thus cooperated with the British mandate authorities at the beginning of the twenties, another prominent woman, Hafsa Khan, cousin of Sheikh Mahmud and married to his brother, Sheikh Kader, arose in the opposition circles of Sulaimani. She was sufficiently wise to accept

responsibility for a group of British officers which had been taken prisoner by her cousin and brother-in-law, Sheikh Mahmud, during the disturbances in that town in 1919. The release of this was determined shortly afterwards when Sheikh Mahmud was captured near the Iranian Pass and, on account of her behaviour, a sentence of death passed upon him was reduced to imprisonment for life, which later was rescinded.

Another prominent Kurdish woman, Fatma Khan, is referred to by Edmonds[4]. After her husband's death she administered his estate which comprised eight villages. Elected by the inhabitants of the villages she appointed, although a woman, with the government authorities.

The information available from various male authors can be summed up as follows: The Kurdish woman is said to possess a far freer position than is the case in other Muslim areas. She does not veil, except in towns and urban surroundings. Monogamic prevails. "Love marriages" are usual.

Below I shall describe the extent to which this information tallies with my personal experiences as a woman amongst Kurdish women in Southern Kurdistan.

Fig. 1: Female woman smoking water in a smoking ghalian. Tripoli.

b: Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

tonne capacity of 110,000 Kw.) is to be completed in 1959 at Dibis on the Little Zab to serve all northern Iraq.

Two of the most widely advertised major projects of the development programme, the great dams at Dukan on the Little Zab and Derbend-i Khan on the Sirwan, are located in Kurdistan and are bringing some temporary benefit to the neighbourhood in the form of wages for labour. But their purpose is first and foremost the protection of Baghdad from flood, and the secondary benefits from storage of water will accrue to the lands down stream. Up stream considerable areas of agricultural land will be submerged and many villages are doomed to destruction. The government is understood to be fully alive to the necessity of tackling the delicate problem of compensating and finding new land for the dispossessed cultivators with foresight and generosity, and of balancing these large spectacular works with lesser projects in the upland valleys which will be of more direct and permanent value to the local people. Failure in this regard might well lead to unrest.

III.

The Kurds have not remained unaffected by the rising tide of nationalism that has swept over the countries of the Middle East since the turn of the century; and to understand the attitude of the Kurds of Iraq to the central government of Baghdad we must cast a brief glance backwards over the history of the region both before and after 1918.

In spite of the centralizing policies of the Ottoman and Persian governments a number of quasi-autonomous Kurdish principalities survived in both countries until about the middle of the 19th century. Two of the princely families are intimately connected with the development of Kurdish nationalism: the Badr Khans of Bohtan (still in Turkey) with their capital at Jazirat ibn Umar (now Cizre), and the Bohtan of Soleimani. It is not easy to fix on any particular date or circumstance as marking the beginning, or even a turning point, in the development of Kurdish nationalism in the modern sense. Throughout the 19th century, both before and after the suppression of the principalities, there were of course frequent revolts against the central authority in which the leaders did not fail to appeal to racial sentiment in order to rally their followers. Modern nationalism, unlike earlier manifestations of a similar spirit, owes so much tremendous importance to language. It would be tempting therefore to suggest that some particular significance attached to the year 1892, when members of the Badr Khan family began the publication of a newspaper called *Kurdistan*, numbers of which appeared at intervals until 1911 in towns as far apart as Cairo, London and (of all unlikely places) Folkestone, England. But in 1891 Haiji Qadir of Koi (circa 1817–1894),

S. Edmonds G-5 (1923, 1943) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

whose patriotic poems in Kurdish are still recited with approval, was already seventy-five years old and thus formed an unbroken literary link with the days when the Baban principality was, in the words of another poet, "neither subject to the Persians, nor slave-driven by the House of Osman."

The first Kurdish political club was founded at Constantinople in 1908 by Amin Ali Badr Khan and General Sharif Pasha of Sulaimani. There was a revival of literary activity during the brief honeymoon after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, when periodicals, anthologies and the like were published at Constantinople in both the northern dialect of Bohtan and the southern dialect of Sulaimani. The preeminence in the south of the language of Sulaimani, which has since established itself as the standard vehicle of literary expression not only in Iraq but also on the Persian side of the frontier, is probably due in part to the patronage extended to letters by the later Baban princes, and in part to the foundation at Sulaimani by the Turks of a military school, cadets from which went on to the academy and staff-college at Constantinople, and so reached a level of education denied to other Kurds;[1] these were officers naturally supplied the intellectual element indispensable for a nationalist movement.

A fresh fillip was given to Kurdish aspirations by the military defeat of Turkey in 1918, and by point 12 of President Woodrow Wilson's "programme of the world's peace" enunciated in January of that year, which stipulated that the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be "assured of an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." Sharif Pasha headed a Kurdish delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris and secured the insertion in the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August, 1920) of provision for the creation in the north-eastern vilayets of Turkey of an independent Kurdistan which the Kurds of Mosul vilayet would have the right to join.

IV.

When the armistice between the Allies and Turkey was signed at Mudros on 30 October, 1918, the British forces pursuing the defeated enemy up the Tigris were about 40 miles south of Mosul city; they were also in occupation of the line of little towns on the high road between Kifri and Altun Kupri. The Turkish troops were required to be clear of the whole of the Mosul vilayet within a fortnight. British policy, dictated by military considerations but nevertheless in full accord with

[1] It was in fulfilment of this function that Kurdish was first made the official language of the administration; a consequence of this was that a large proportion of the officials in the other Kurdish districts have at some time been Sulaimani men.

S. Edmonds G-S (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Kurd MA11

the idealistic spirit of the time, was at first to avoid commitments in the hills by setting up one or more semi-autonomous Kurdish provinces to be loosely attached to whatever regular administration might eventually be established in the plains. Even before the armistice contract had been established with a certain Shaykh Mahmud, head of the leading Sayyid family of Southern Kurdistan, who was informed that any Kurdish groups or tribes in the three *liwa* of Sulaimani, Kirkuk and Arbil which might wish to accept his leadership would be allowed to do so. It soon became evident, however, that the Shaykh had overestimated his popularity, and his province was eventually restricted to little more than the *liwa* of Sulaimani. No similar initiative was taken in regard to the Kurdish districts in the *liwa* of Mosul, where there was no articulate Kurdish opinion.

This first experiment in Kurdish autonomy under modern conditions was not a success. Within six months the Shaykh, resenting the limitations placed on his freedom to do exactly as he liked, rebelled. After a short military operation he was captured and deported, and the *liwa* was brought under the direct administration of the Occupation Authority. But quite apart from Shaykh Mahmud's personal ambitions there was always present in Sulaimani, among all classes of the population, an abiding conviction, rooted in their history, that the place contained the germs of a revived and extensive Kurdish state of which it was the predestined capital. The belief had little justification either in its physical appearance and commercial importance or in the academic attainments and political experience of its citizens, but it was always in the air. The proposal that Sulaimani with the adjacent districts should once more become an autonomous territory, therefore, had not come to the people as anything strange.

For the other political leaders the fall of Mahmud was thus no reason for renouncing the glittering prize brought so near by the Treaty of Sèvres. Assurances had been given in the British Parliament that the Kurds would not be forced to come under an Arab government against their will, and when the Provisional National Government of Iraq was formed in November, 1920, Sulaimani remained under the direct control of the British High Commissioner. Kirkuk (which then included Arbil) did accept a *Mutasarrif* (Governor) nominated by the new government, but he, like all the other officials, was a local man, and Turkish, the language of the educated urban classes (but not of the majority of the inhabitants), continued to be used for official purposes. When in June, 1921, the Amir Faysal arrived in Iraq as the candidate sponsored by the British Government for the throne Sulaimani refused to participate in the referendum; Kirkuk did participate but announced for most of the

9: Edmonds C-5 (1923, 1941) 1957 MA11 Rev'd MA11

[175 142 148] negative were cast. No representative from either line attended the economic commission.

A difficult situation had been further complicated by the proclamation in January, 1930, by the Turkish Cabinet of a manifesto known as the 'National Pact' which, while conceding the right to self-determination of the Arabs south of the armistice line of 1918, refused to contemplate the surrender of the Mosul vilayet. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed by the representatives of the Sultan nine months later, was never ratified. For the next few years the Kurds were subjected to a campaign of intensive propaganda from Turkey; threats of invasion, clandestine correspondence with urban and tribal leaders, open incitements to rebellion, warnings to 'traitors,' and pervading all, the religious appeal for loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph (until the Caliphate was abolished in March 1924). Small bodies of uniformed Turkish troops actually crossed the border at various points in support of the restive tribes. The administrative boundary in Arbil and parts of Mosul was withdrawn to the edge of the plains, and in September, 1922, the whole of Sulaimani was evacuated. Shaykh Mahmud was brought back in return for an undertaking that he would secure the expulsion of the Turks from the Iraq and that he would refrain from interfering in the neighbouring lines of Kirkuk and Arbil. But in the intoxicating mountain air these promises were soon forgotten. In November the Shaykh proclaimed himself 'King of Kurdistan,' claimed the whole country down to the Jabal Hamrin as part of his 'Kingdom,' and so far from expelling the Turks sought to use their presence as a lever to press his ambitions. In December the British and Iraqi governments, hoping to rally the more moderate Kurds to resist the aggressor, made a joint communication to certain friendly leaders recognizing 'the right of the Kurds of Iraq to set up a Kurdish government' which should send responsible delegates as soon as possible to discuss boundaries and political and economic relations; but there was nobody capable of taking advantage of the offer, which lapsed.*

[148]

The prevailing uncertainty and unrest were actually aggravated by the signature at Lausanne in July, 1923, of a Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey, for it specifically excluded the Mosul question from the settlement. In August, 1924, the dispute was referred to the League of Nations. A Commission was sent to examine the problem on the spot, and, in December, 1925, the Council awarded the vilayet to Iraq subject to guarantees that regard would be paid to the 'desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed

* The activities of Shaykh Mahmud constituted a series of on and off military operations in the years that followed. Sulaimani town itself was occupied by the Iraqi forces in July, 1924, but the Shaykh continued to harry the administration until June, 1931, when he submitted. He was in open revolt in 1930 in connexion with the impending settlement, and again in 1932, when he gave himself up in 1932.

9: Edmonds C-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MAII Kurd MAII

for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice and the teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the language of all these services.' The Turkish government at first refused to accept the decision but, by a tripartite treaty between the United Kingdom, Iraq and Turkey signed at Ankara in June, 1926, finally renounced its sovereignty over the Mosul vilayet. The administration of the three liwas was then assimilated to that of the rest of Iraq except in the matter of the official language and the race of the officials.

The Turkish menace was hardly out of the way when the approach of the end of the Mandate for Iraq roused misgivings among the leaders of Kurdish opinion as to the value of the guarantees. Petitions to the League were treated as treason, and in 1930 and 1931 many highly respected Kurdish intellectuals were imprisoned. When the application of Iraq for admission to the League came up for consideration in 1932 the Council received from the Iraqi government a written Declaration, which was to rank as part of the Constitution, reaffirming its undertakings in regard to the minorities. A special law was enacted defining the areas within which Kurdish and Turkish should be the language of the local administration, of the law courts, and of primary education.

For the next few years there was little manifestation of political nationalism in Iraq. The hard logic of facts seemed to have persuaded the leaders, some sooner, some later, that their hopes were impossible of realization; most of them settled down quietly, salving their patriotic consciences, perhaps, with the vague idea that one day another world conflagration might give their sons or grandsons their opportunity and that in the meantime any agitation would do more harm than good.

During the year preceding the outbreak of the Second World War there were indications that the German Legation in Baghdad was spreading propaganda, especially among young men of the official classes, that the Kurds had been grossly betrayed by Britain at the end of the last war but that a victorious Germany was ready to create an independent Kurdistan after the war. But after the actual outbreak of hostilities the older nationalists continued convinced that neither side was likely to alienate the Arabs for a small and inconsiderable unimportant people like the Kurds, and preferred to take no initiative. In the spring of 1941, when Rashid 'Ali staged his *coup d'état* against the Regent and the lawful government of Iraq, Shaykh Mahmud escaped from Baghdad, where he had been living in honourable exile, and did indeed obtain some support from the younger generation and among the tribes for the idea of a revolt based on the belief that, 'the combustibility of the Arabs' having now become excessive, the Allies would no longer hesitate to give the Kurds

9: Edmonds C-5 (1923, 1945) 1957 MA11 Hard MA11

their 'rights'; but with the conversion of the Empire, a staunch friend of the Allies, the movement, such as it was, lost all momentum.

V.

'Do as you would be done by' is not a maxim that seems to have appealed very much to the various formerly subject peoples, in Europe or in Asia, who have been liberated since 1918, and it was hardly to be expected that the Arabs of Iraq would prove an exception. Even in Ottoman times the three vilayets had been considered as constituting a single unit, Turkish Arabia in British official parlance, and any scheme of partition on racial lines to meet the aspirations of a minority was as unpalatable as similar ideas have been to majorities elsewhere. Against any suggestion that the central government should make a special effort to conciliate the Kurds by recognizing their existence qua Kurds and not merely as individuals enjoying the ordinary civil liberties like anybody else, it was at first argued that since the greater part of Kurdistan lay outside Iraq any concession in this direction could only encourage the separatist tendencies of the Kurds of Iraq and that it would lead to demands for similar privileges from other racial or religious groups.

On the Kurdish side, quite apart from the initial unwillingness to accept subordination to the Arabs who had been a subject race like themselves, it was felt that the guarantees given to the League in 1925 and again in 1932 were being either ignored or at any rate grudgingly implemented. Statistics could be adduced to show that the Kurdish districts were not getting their fair share of the social services or development projects. Particularly bitter were complaints that the schools were inadequate in both quality and number, that failure to prepare and distribute school-books in Kurdish was making a mockery of the promises regarding the language instruction, and that Kurdish students were not being accepted for instruction of higher education or educational missions abroad. The big-spending Department of Irrigation was not represented in the north at all. In the sphere of Public Works there were complaints that all the emphasis was on police posts, and it was indeed the fact that even the construction of roads was for some years held back by the defensive strategy of a Ministry of Defence which regarded them as facilities for an invader rather than a means of consolidating the administration and benefiting the population. The claim, made at the League of Nations and elsewhere, that the Kurds were always adequately represented in the Cabinet was demonstrably disingenuous, since the Ministers in question, even if they could claim remote Kurdish origin, generally belonged to families long assimilated and were Arab rather than Kurdish in sentiment.

9: Edmonds G-S (1922, 1945) 1957. MA11 Kurd MA11

Insofar as these grievances had some foundation in fact enough has already been said to show that the prevailing state of affairs was due, in part at any rate, to political circumstances beyond the control of the government, and in part to the recalcitrance of the Kurds themselves which for long periods had brought the administration in a large part of Kurdistan to a standstill. Some of the neglect, too, was undoubtedly due not to malice but to a tendency, not unknown elsewhere, for the higher authorities to take more thought for the parts of the country near the centre than for the distant outposts.

However that may be, the result was that just when the earlier agitators were developing into elder statesmen who, schooled by experience, no longer regarded separation as feasible or desirable there was growing up a new generation nurtured on a sense of grievance and frustration. Resentment was further embittered by insulting references to the minorities now subsequently made by pan-Arab writers in moments of fanatical exaltation. In all the countries of the Middle East the western Powers are regarded as the supporters of the old reactionary Beys and Pashas who have retained most of the political power in their own hands (the charge is unfair but it would prolong this paper unduly to examine it here). It is only to be expected, then, that disgruntled youth (and especially young Kurds with a racial added to a social grievance) should look to Russia for its inspiration. The Russians have long been the neighbours of the Kurds through the Caucasian provinces, and, as we have seen, a small part of Kurdistan lies within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. Even before 1918 Kurdish malcontents in Turkey and Persia were accustomed to seek support from the Russians. For the Russian exploitation of Kurdish unrest would be nothing new, indeed something of the kind has been unsuccessfully recently at the time of the short-lived 'Kurdish Republic' of Mahabad in Persian Kurdistan, and again in 1947 when Mulla Mustafa of Barzan, a fugitive rebel from Iraq, was welcomed in Soviet Armenia, given high military rank, and encouraged to broadcast in Kurdish from Erivan.

But with every year that passes any concerted armed revolt becomes more improbable. The mercantile classes, realizing as they do that economically the Kurdish north is bound hand and foot to Baghdad, have never shown any enthusiasm for anything but the mildest form of nationalism, and the programme of development now in hand must have the effect of binding the whole country together more closely than ever before. The old loyalties to religious Shaykhs and tribal Aghas have been too deeply undermined for any self-appointed leader to command a serious measure of support in any violent adventure. The complexity of modern weapons has given the government an overwhelming advantage

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MAII Kurd MAII

However, the formal political organization gives only a partial picture of the actual power hierarchy and organization in the village; and the remainder of the paper will attempt to show how this power hierarchy emerges, and what the characteristics of the resulting type of social organization are.

By way of introduction, the ethnic position and history of the Kurds should be sketched briefly. The great majority of Kurds are today, and have been for some time, settled or transhumant joint cereal agriculturalists and stock-breeders; some tribes are still purely pastoral nomads, of what has been called the *vertical*-, Persian type. The Kurds inhabit the mountainous country stretching from the Euphrates in northern Syria and Turkey to Kermanshah in Persia; the backbone of this country is formed by the Zagros mountains. Towards the Mesopotamian plain they extend roughly through the foothill area; to the North and East, Kurdish territory blends into that of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In much of their area, Kurds make up only a minority of the total population. Southern Kurdistan is, on the other hand, almost exclusively inhabited by Kurds. (cf. Map No. 1.)

The population density in most Kurdish territory is very low, the characteristic settlement pattern is in small, compact villages of 10 to 100 inhabitants, widely scattered over the area. The Kurds today are estimated to number some 3 million (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951), but of that figure a great number are urbanized or turkicized, and Kurds by descent only.

The Kurdish language belongs to the Indo-European stock and shows great similarity to Persian, but also exhibits features that suggest a process of parallel development and borrowing rather than recent splitting. Literary efforts in Kurdish have been only sporadic. Historical records seem to accord Kurds as an ethnic group considerable antiquity in the area (Minorsky, 1943), assuming them to be the Cardukhi who harried the retreat of Xenophon's 10 000 (401—400 B.C.). Early converted to Islam, independent Kurd principalities attained some degree of organization only after the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate, but generally played a minor role (except in producing Saladin at the time of the 1st Crusade). A major part of

[page continues on p. 2]

Kurdish territory was conquered by the Ottoman Sultan Selim I, 1515 but retained considerable local autonomy, leading to adjustment rather than replacement of traditional Kurdish organization.

The area generally called Southern Kurdistan, where the present material was collected, may be delimited on ethnic and geographical grounds (cf. Map. No. 2). It is bounded on the north by the Lower Zab, on the south by the Diyala river. To the east it stretches up into the Zagros mountains to the Persian frontier. A western border can only be drawn on ethnic, and rather arbitrary criteria, since Kurdish territory extends in part beyond the foothill area, into a zone where Kurd and Arab villagers and villages mingle.

Physiographically, the area is characterized by a series of ridges 1933 running NW—SE, building up towards the Persian mountains. The drainage pattern is rather complex, partly leading to the Lower Zab, partly to the Diyala, and some smaller rivers disappearing in the dry areas south and west of the city of Kirkuk.

In the lowlands, the «Garmian» (lowlands) of the Kurds, conditions approach semi-desert, and agriculture becomes increasingly difficult. Kurdish territory stretches in places to the edge of what has been called the rainfall zone (Wagner, 1949, p. 180), but generally falls somewhat short of this, leaving the remaining area to Arab agriculturalists with an identical economy.

Though predominantly Kurdish, the area shows some ethnic diver- 1913
sity. There is contact with permanent Arab settlements in a rather broad zone of mixture. Bedouin herdsmen in the summer graze their camels as far as the Chamchamal valley, and have at times remained in the area continuously for several years. The city of Kirkuk has a considerable Turkish-speaking population, and Turkish-speaking villages may still be found in a wide crescent of the lower districts. Some 100 years ago, Turkomans certainly occupied some of these areas (Rich, 1836). The town of Sulaimani had till 1951 a considerable Jewish population, as well as the still persisting small Chaldean Christian minority.

The Kurds themselves exhibit considerable diversity, ranging from tribally organized nomadic herdsmen to feudal peasants. The Garmian lowlands are mainly peopled by detribalized sedentary farmers

82 The southern sections around Qizil Robat are formed by settled members of the Jaf tribe, working as tenants on their old tribal land. Here are also the winter camps of the nomadic Jaf. The Shahr-i-zor plains around the town of Halabja are the summer camp grounds of the same group, and support a large population of nomad Jaf. The summer grazing grounds of the nomads lie in the high mountains around Penjwin.

The Chemchemal valley is the territory of the Hawrewazi tribe of freeholding farmers, partly co-habiting the area with an impoverished semi-tribal serf group. In the basal valley around Sulaimani are non-tribal tenant farmers, in the high area of Pushdh, further north, are tribally organized farmers. The Hawrewazian in the Zagros range by Halabja are dialectically and ethnically rather distinct, tribally organized, usually freeholding garden farmers or craftsmen.

• 175 Some historical orientation is necessary. The city of Sulaimani was for centuries the capital of a rather independent Pushdh segment of the Ottoman Empire, ruled by Pashas of the Baban family. This Pushdh included most if not all the territory described above. A strong feudal pattern became established, and centralized government was moderately effective, leading to a breakdown of most tribal political organizations and the development of a large group of serfs and tenant farmers. Conditions during Baban rule are well described by Claudius James Rich (1836). a very observant traveller in the early 19th century. Due to complex intrigue in Baghdad and Istanbul, Baban rule was suddenly brought to an end in 1851, and considerable instability resulted. The Jaf tribe, on the one hand, became powerful and assimilated numerous groups of other tribes in their organization; the Jaf leaders consolidated their positions as landowners and took on the appearance more of feudal lords than tribal chiefs. On the other hand, the Hawrewazi tribe entered on a career of opportunistic brigandage and war, and, though a very small tribe, became quite powerful. Sulaimani became the scene of a tug of war between these various interests and the efforts of a minor family of the Bamerne to re-establish some form of Pushdh. After the end of the First World War, conditions slowly became more

middle, and official administrators, dressed from Baghdad, grew in scope and progressively enlarged its area of effective control.

Such then is the background of the villages where the following material was collected. They are primarily tenant villages in the Sulaimani valley, or villages dominated by freeholding Hamawand farmers. However, certain aspects of local social structure become clear only by comparison with other situations — particularly those found in the *Jaf* areas — or by historical comparisons and deductions. The data on *Jaf* organization was obtained from a limited number of informants on short visits to various villages. For historical material, C. J. Rich's accounts (op.cit) have been found most useful.

I have tried to avoid bringing conditions and forces in the towns of Sulaimani, Chamchamal, Halabja, etc. into the picture. The enormous influence in these centers are extremely complicated and difficult to evaluate. In the institution of the clan and sub-clan system, differential contacts and reactions due to sub-cultures are indeed complex. The rural areas, on the other hand, show greater uniformity in patterns: the tribal areas are organized and separable, and the tenant villagers, in their small, endogamous communities, have strong patterns of localism and traditionalism. There is a popular story illustrating this localism: A donkey belonging to one of the tenant farmers in a village ran away; as the farmer followed it, so much it. The donkey climbed up the hillside, far away from the village, but the farmer did not want to lose it. So he followed it high up into the mountains, never turning, and finally close to the mountain top he caught it. On turning around he saw below him the whole beautiful Shahr-i-zor plain, in which his own village lay. The peasant gasped and exclaimed: «I never knew the world was so vast!»

What goes on in the towns belongs, as far as most villagers are concerned, to a quite separate world, and a second both in the field and in working up the notes valid to separate off the Kurdish countryside as the area of study. But due to diversity even in this area, any attempt at giving a conventional ethnographical description of «the culture of the society» must fail. Each of the compact, widely separated little villages shows characteristics of its own, local

the presumption that everything not legislated in terms of the order is outside its scope. The king or the succession of such a name does not act counter to the traditional order, . . . loyalty is due, not to 'the order', but to him personally.» (Pareto, op. cit., p. 121).

The main contrast between the Kurdish system and this «ruly ideal» type lies in the implication in the definition of the latter that concrete traditional prescriptions are indeed accepted and agreed upon by all. The cultural homogeneity of the South Kurdish area has been emphasized above; this homogeneity makes for a situation where a truly traditional system can not operate. Any single concrete traditional prescription tends to be questioned by all but a minority, and conflicting interpretations of what is in fact the traditional order are constantly advanced. As a result, the theme of power attains an overriding importance, following the line of reasoning that if you can get away with something, it can't be very wrong. The ultimate check on excesses in the use of power is the threat of murder. Though there is obviously much more control with this system, Kurds are rightly famous for being subject-happy, and a person who strongly feels that his rights have been infringed upon may go to great lengths to retaliate. Thus no institutional means exist, violence has become institutionalized as the only mechanism of final

It is tempting to see the present situation as the result of breakdown of a formerly functioning traditional system. There is considerable evidence indicating that Southern Kurdistan some 100 years ago was better integrated than today, in the form of a strongly feudal Pashalik centering around Sulaimani. The Baban Pashas of Sulaimani had frequent opportunities during conflicts with both the Persian and the Ottoman rulers to show that they had the unquestioning support of an overriding majority of the population, and through several centuries of rule they built up a traditional hierarchy of hereditary nurse positions, entitling persons to political offices (Rich op. cit., p. 111). The traditional nature of the rule is strikingly brought out in the following citation, where the Pasha of Sulaimani explains the solidarity that his subjects feel towards him by contrast-

ing his form of rule to that of the feudal usurper in Siraz, Persia: «You are not the lord of a tribe, nor are your men your tribesmen. You may clothe them, feed them, and make them rich, but they are not your cousins, they are but your servants» (*Ibid*, p. 84).

When Bahrs rule was broken in 1911, Ottoman legal practice as well as personal whim set a freeing in the sun. This contributed further to the breakdown of traditional principles, since it offered individuals the opportunity to manipulate the two different systems, traditional usage and Ottoman legal code, to their own advantage. The most profoundly affected land tenure. All land, unless otherwise registered, was deemed to belong to the Ottoman Sultan. Though the rule existed that no whole village should be registered as the property of any single person, this and other rules were generally overlooked. Thus leaders of *dera*, *Begs*, or in fact any other person who could bribe a few witnesses, registered large tracts of land as their personal property. Although actual power was of course necessary to make these formal connections effective so far as the collecting of tax was concerned, the result was that a category of landowner emerged for which there was no clear traditional precedents, and their claims, when supported by power and supported Ottoman land code, could not truly be disputed. As a result, the field was left open to individual exploitation on a much larger scale than in Bahrs times, and the only effective checks were the above mentioned closure to the personal salary of the exploiter.

COMPOSITE COMMUNITIES

In the Hamawand area, some local groups are found today where ethnically organized Hamawand exploit a non-tribal tenant population (*Mankijin*) as a serf group. Such situations have come about by recent military conquest, and show incipient developments of a caste system. Certain aspects of organization have been developed by the Hamawand as an adjustment to this situation.

The Hamawand formal political structure already outlined was also a military hierarchy of command. Each village was expected to muster a group of horsemen, usually 10—11, led by the village *Agha*, as a fighting unit in the Hamawand army. Each of these soldiers,

[illegible] tribal system would be by demonstrating (or assuming) genealogical connection. This can hardly be done on any grand scale where common residence is virtually impossible, except on based on a relationship of conqueror and conquered.

As a result, the Kurdish tribal village retains a high degree of lineage unity, reckoned entirely patrilineally, as compared to Nuer villages. The Kurd who leaves his tribal territory, or even village, can obtain no political power in his new environment, therefore has minimal prestige, and thus tends to remain with his lineage group. But because of this, the Kurdish lineage system has not the adaptability of the Nuer system, and tends drawn in a situation of conquest or external administration.

642 ORGANIZATION OF THE BABAN POLITICAL
175 STRUCTURE

In the light of these extensive examples from Homeward territory today, some of the characteristics of the old Baban rule become much clearer. The Baban themselves were not a tribe, but a complex lineage of the same type as the Jaf Begzade, ultimately derived from the ruling tribe of the Pushdir area. Their power, however was based on the tribally organized groups, and a majority of the villages seem to have been controlled in the fashion of the above Homeward villages, with a basic split between a ruling, tribally organized soldiery caste and a non-tribal peasant population. The separation was clearly recognized by Rich in 1820, and in his list of the population of the Pushdir, only the Pushdir area is described as wholly tribal, the earlier districts are mixed. Some inhabitants are of the peasant, some of the clannish race (= tribally organized), i. e., no village has inhabitants of one exclusive kind." (Rich op. cit., p. 280). The tribally organized minority was employed by the Baban to control the larger population: "... it would serve the Ser Sun (Omar Agha, one of the feudal lords under the Baban) to keep the citizen or peasant caste in his service. They never grow much attached, nor will they stand by you in any difficulties. The clansmen (= tribal Kurd), on the contrary, though not of your own clan (= tribe), grows warmly attached to you; and then neither hunger, thirst,

641 poverty, fatigue, war danger, over others him or separate him from
• 175 men's (ibid., p. 243-4).

A tentative reconstruction of the formal organization of the Balum Pukalik suggested by this is schematically represented below, diagram No. 4.



Diagram No. 4. Formal organization of the Balum Pukalik.

641 157

THE CHARISMA OF THE LEADER

In the formal political organization, principles and social sequence derived both from the lineage system and the feudal system can thus be combined, and a more complex structure created. This is made all the more possible because of the similar organizational structural in the person of the leader in both these systems. The qualifications and requirements for leadership will be discussed more fully in a later section, p. 119; however, some of the characteristics of the formal organization derive from the nature of leadership in Kurdish culture.

DS Reference G-3 (on desk) 1940 S65.11 Rural S65.11
Iraq

341 Sulaimaniya is the chief town in Iraqi
349 Kurdistan, in that it is the largest town in the Kurdish area whose population is entirely Kurdish. Other towns exist in Iraqi Kurdistan, but the larger ones—Kirkuk, Erbil and Kifri—are inhabited by as many Turcomans as Kurds, although the tribes around are Kurdish. Kurds are essentially shepherds of the mountains, and do not take easily to the life of a townsman.

175 In this they resemble their distant
178 relatives the Pathans of Afghanistan and north-western India, who, in the early migrations of Aryan-speaking peoples, penetrated into the highlands east of the Persian plateau while the Kurds spread westwards into what is now north-western Iran, eastern Turkey and north-eastern Iraq. There, in secluded mountain valleys, they preserved many ancient characteristics which their fellow migrants, settling

[p. 383(B)]

[illegible]

in the Persian plains, but through contact with the outside world. By the time recorded history begins, Kurds and Persians were already recognized as distinct peoples, the former being known as Medes.

Some five years before the birth of Christ and 1200 before the spread of Islam, a Kurdish prophet, Zerdusht (Zoroaster), grew up among the mountains of the Azerbaijan district near the Caspian Sea. The gospel that he preached, in its primitive and simple form, is to a greater extent the basis of Christianity and Islam than the adherents of those world religions usually admit. The Kurd of today, however, knows nothing of this. He is nominally a Muhammedan, and has even on occasions been stirred by the call of "Jihad"—the holy war—in the name of Islam. But beneath the surface there lurk some curious remnants of Zoroastrian tradition.

The Kurdish tribesman has a childlike
157 sense of humour. Like a child, too, he
609 unconsciously appreciates sympathy and
an understanding of his psychology. It is
partly because ruling races were in-
different to such considerations until the
evolution of British colonial policy in
backward countries that the Kurd has
been accustomed to regard every foreign
power as an enemy to be driven off or
excommunicated before he himself suffers a
similar fate.

181 Like other mountain peoples the Kurds
• 176 are a martial race, but owing to their
separate communities and 'clannishness'
they have never featured as such in
modern history. The only Kurdish king-
dom known to Europe is the ancient
kingdom of the Medes. Nevertheless the
Kurds have produced many great indi-
vidual soldiers. First and foremost comes
Cyrus the Great, who united the Medes
and Persians and in 538 B.C. conquered
Babylon. Others have found fame as

[p. 345(c)]
[last reads need on p 390(B)]

10(Johnson G-3 (no date) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Iraq

leaders in Moslem armies, from Saladin (Salah ad Din) in the hosts that opposed the Crusaders, to the late Bekr Sidqi in the army of Iraq; but they have never drawn attention to their Kurdish origin, as the name 'Kurd' implies a shepherd, which in the East is considered a lowly occupation not worthy of great men.

Some have carved for themselves small kingdoms among the tribes of their own race. But that very martial spirit which makes the Kurd proud and independent, and forbids him to acknowledge the sovereignty of anyone outside his tribe for long, has prevented the Kurds from becoming united under any one chief and thus imprinting their name on the history of the world.

In the history of the new state of Iraq individual Kurds have already made their impression. The best-known is Shaikh

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